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Abstract. This study intends to examine the larger issues related to capital liberalisation and 
also to analyse the reasons for recent support of capital mobility and its repercussions for 
the future prospects of the economies of developing countries. The objective is to critically 
examine relevant empirical and theoretical studies in order to answer these questions and 
address the objectives of this study. The methodology adopted in this study relies on 
secondary information, reports and published studies to address the research questions. The 
study finds that following the adoption of capital liberalisation and neoliberalism, the 
economies of most developing countries have become more vulnerable. If China is 
excluded, we find that most developing economies have been unable to expand 
employment opportunities or reduce levels of poverty. In recent years capital liberalisation 
policy has encouraged capital flight from their economies.  
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1. Introduction 
his study aims to provide a deeper understanding of developing economies, 
by not simply re-emphasising the importance of capital control, but also 
highlighting the dynamics of transition that these economies are facing. The 
word ‘capital’ can be used to refer to ‚foreign direct investment‛, that is capital 
invested into productive assets, which is not liquid, and ‚portfolio investment and 
bank loans‛, which are highly liquid and could have wider impact on a country’s 
economy if left to flow unrestricted across borders. Financial liberalisation is a set 
of measures including central bank autonomy and freedom of movement of capital, 
and can also mean convertibility of currency, abandoning ‘priority sectors’, and 
adopting a policy of lending at differential interest rates to promote strategic 
sectors or industries in the domestic economy (Chang & Grabel, 2014). 
Economists refer to capital control as a range of policies that are designed to 
manage global capital flows. Such policy initiatives can take many forms. For 
instance, restrictions can be placed on foreign investment in certain sectors, on 
capital outflows, or on access to the domestic or foreign currencies. Capital control 
received more support following the East Asian crisis in 1997-98 since previous 
policies of capital liberalisation as a result of IMF pressures resulted in a huge 
inflow of foreign capital into the East Asian economies, which was reflected in a 
lending boom and domestic banks taking greater risks. The government failed to 
prevent funds from being used to finance speculative activities (Dymski, 2010). 
Policy can place restrictions on foreign capital investment in domestic assets 
(government securities and bank deposits) or on domestic capital moving abroad. 
As extreme measures to control market forces, the government may impose control 
over international transactions. If the government wants to have virtual control over 
foreign exchange, it can decide who they would like to distribute those foreign 
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currencies, the advantage being that with such measures it can influence the 
markets. Capital control can provide greater options for economic matters and 
policies, especially fiscal and monetary policies (Dymski, 2010). The balance of 
payments can also be influenced by capital control measures. 
Those in favour of capital liberalisation argue that capital will flow from the 
developed countries, where it provides low marginal returns, to developing 
countries where it is assumed that it is scarce, meaning that free capital movement 
would imply high marginal returns (Crotty & Epstein, 1999; Siddiqui, 2016a). 
They subscribe to the policy of removing foreign exchange controls in developing 
countries so that they can run large current account deficits. This means that capital 
account liberalisation was expected to delink investment from domestic savings. 
Following such policies was expected to increase investment in developing 
countries meaning that would have more capital, which would be greater than their 
domestic savings, and would invest more, and ultimately, they would have higher 
growth rates. As Maurice Obstfeld (1998) has noted,  
‚economic theory leaves no doubt about the potential advantages‛ of capital 
account liberalization, which is also sometimes called financial openness. 
This permits the international capital market to channel world savings to their 
most profitable regions in the world. Those developing countries with has 
little domestic savings can borrow to finance investment, thereby could 
experience growth rates without requiring sharp increases in their own 
saving. However, Obstfeld also warns the possible risks of openness to 
foreign financial flows and concluded that ‚this duality of benefits and risks 
is inescapable in the real world‛ (Obstfeld, 1998:28). 
The relationship between financial openness and economic growth is far from 
straight forward. Most surprisingly, the recent the IMF study (2016) has openly 
expressed scepticism about its earlier position on neoliberalism. The IMF study 
argues:  
‚Some capital inflows, such as foreign direct investment-which may include 
a transfer of technology or human capital-do seem to boost long-term growth. 
But the impact of other flows-such as portfolio investment and banking and 
especially hot, or speculative, debt inflows-seem neither to boost growth nor 
allow the country to better share risks with its trading partners… This 
suggests that the growth and risk-sharing benefits of capital flows depend on 
which type of flow is being considered; it may also depend on the nature of 
supporting institutions and policies… Although growth benefits are 
uncertain, costs in terms of increased economic volatility and crisis frequency 
seem more evident. Since 1980, there have been about 150 episodes of surges 
in capital inflows in more than 50 emerging market economies‛ (Ostry, et al, 
2016). 
In fact, since the adoption of neoliberal reforms in the 1980s, the inflow of 
foreign capital into the economies of developing countries has risen sharply; 
however, not all of them experienced rapid growth (Siddiqui, 2014a). The adoption 
of a capital liberalisation policy did lead to a rise in growth rates in some 
developing countries, but exposed them to economic vulnerability and financial 
crisis. Those in favour of capital liberalisation suggest that this largely happened 
due to short-term inflows, which increase the risk of sudden capital flow reversals 
(Bonizzi, 2014). On the other hand, critics of this policy such as Feldstein & 
Horioka (1980) highlighted the difficulties of capital liberalisation, concluding that 
there is a high correlation between domestic saving and investment ratios. Other 
studies also found that most of the East Asian countries that have had high growth 
rates also had very high domestic savings and were net creditors, not net 
borrowers, and also had a current account surplus. 
Capital liberalization is one of the most controversial aspects of modern 
political economy. The problem seems to be due not only to liberalisation rules 
governing inflows of capital but to those affecting portfolio capital investments, 
which is short-term and speculative. Here, we intend to examine why capital 
liberalisation has become so important to the economy of a country and why 
neglecting this or leaving it to market forces, has frequently led to economic 
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instability in developing countries in recent years (Siddiqui, 1998). The experience 
of the Latin America and East Asian countries in the 1990s shows that those 
countries that made the effort to become financially more open and integrated, 
paradoxically witnessed higher levels of economic and financial instability 
(Ocampo & Stiglitz, 2008). 
During the East Asian crisis of 1997, capital flows were seen as an important 
element in the currency and exchange rate crisis. Therefore, control of capital 
movements has been suggested as a means of supporting fixed exchange rates and 
avoiding speculative attacks on currencies. A ‘developmental model’ followed 
earlier in the East Asian countries meant governments undertook a number of 
independent policy measures to reduce vulnerability to global financial shocks 
(Wade, 1990; Siddiqui, 2016a). 
The strategy of East Asian export-oriented economies has been to achieve 
higher domestic savings relative to investment. Policy intervention helps to 
maintain desirable exchange rates and competitiveness. At the same time the 
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves allows them to maintain the 
undervaluation of foreign exchange rate to stimulate exports (Siddiqui, 2016b). 
There has been wide discussion concerning whether the East Asian crisis was 
due to ‚over-lending‛ and ‚over-borrowing‛, which might have been re-enforced 
by distortions in incentives or regulations. Commenting on the reasons for this 
crisis Arestis & Glickman (2002) note, 
‚The most striking of these relates to the question of whether the source of 
the Asian crisis was endogenous or exogenous and the related issue of the 
coincidence or otherwise of financial liberalisation and financial crisis. A 
further crucial difference is that whilst [the conventional view] holds one 
group of actors or another to blame our Minskyan thesis incorporates all of 
them into an endogenous interpretation of the crisis‛ (Arestis & Glickman, 
2002:255). 
They argue that many developing countries lack the domestic savings and 
foreign capital that could help to finance their business activities. However, the 
proponents of foreign capital ignore the fact that certain types of foreign capital can 
provide long-term investment and business commitment, while other capital 
inflows might be short-term and less stable. When economic crisis hit these 
developing countries, capital rapidly left them for the safety of developed 
economies (Minsky, 1986). 
The methodology followed here is derived from the aims of the study and 
comparisons of international statistics are used as the main means of addressing the 
research questions and the objectives of this paper. Analysing relevant literature, 
empirical studies, and existing secondary data is the only possible way to obtain 
macroeconomic data. These include data from official sources and from 
international institutions such as the World Bank, IMF, OECD and UNCTAD. 
The study also intends to critically examine the wider issues related to the 
capital movements in the developing countries including their economic stability 
and sovereignty. Financial globalisation represents a very important development 
in recent global economy. In this current phase of globalization, capital is far more 
mobile than it ever was in the past. In fact, the colonial period was characterised by 
segregation in the world economy, despite free trade, and no legal means was in 
place to control the flow of capital from the metropolis to the colonies (Siddiqui, 
2015a). However, despite the availability of low wages, capital did not move freely 
in the colonies, except in certain limited spheres such as mining, railways and 
plantations (Chang & Grabel, 2014; Siddiqui, 1989). The neo-classical model of 
perfect competition, with perfect information and perfect capital markets does not 
hold in the real world. 
During the 1930s Latin America delinked themselves from the world’s 
capitalist economies and began a policy of import substitution industrialisation and, 
as a result, experienced higher growth rates, allowing them to establish a 
manufacturing sector.   
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Another question arises concerning the evidence supporting the proposition? 
that capital liberalization would be good for developing countries, a policy which 
was imposed through ‘structural adjustment programme’ and ‘globalisation’ by the 
World Bank and IMF. The World Trade Organisation (WTO) also supports capital 
liberalisation and suggests that it is good for growth, as it provided more capital for 
investments. However, it does not provide any clear evidence that this is promoting 
economic stability in the developing countries (Crotty & Epstein, 1999). 
In December 2015, WTO’s ministerial conference in Nairobi explicitly 
discussed GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services). During this meeting, 
as had previously been the case, it was obvious that the developed countries were 
keen to support capital liberalisation. In fact, in the developed countries services 
account for rising share of output and employment. In addition the manufacturing 
sector in these countries has generally become less competitive whilst the financial 
sector has become more significant and is dominated by the financial centres of 
New York, London and Frankfurt. Liberalisation in financial services was the most 
important element of globalisation, increasing the developed countries financial 
companies’ access into the markets of developing countries. This was possible due 
to the removal of domestic capital control measures and the reduction in domestic 
financial regulation in recent years. 
 
2. Capital Mobility, Current Account Surplus and Growth 
Rates 
Those countries that have witnessed rapid growth rates also have a considerable 
positive current account. With the non-availability of foreign capital inflows, 
countries with current account deficits are forced to devalue, and as a result imports 
are more expensive and exports cheaper. Such policy measures are expected to lead 
to improvements in the balance of payments situation. The liberalisation of capital 
measures increases capital inflows, but may also lead to appreciation in exchange 
rates, as witnessed in many developing countries in recent years, which drove 
down their export demands and increased imports, leading to negative current 
accounts and currency crises. For example, in China in the early 2000s, the central 
bank intervened in the foreign exchange markets to keep Renminbi appreciation 
under control (Bond & Garcia, 2015). As Figure 1 shows, the relationship between 
current account surplus and growth rates has been positive. 
In Figure 2, the upper left-hand quadrant shows current account deficits 
matched to capital account surplus as is often seen in text books. However, in the 
lower right-hand quadrant countries such as Russia and Nigeria show the problems 
associated with the ‘resource-curse’. Such countries appear to have capital account 
deficits, which are financed by current account surplus. Periodic overvaluation may 
be caused by large inflows of foreign capital associated with their resource sector, a 
case of the so-called ‚Dutch disease‛, meaning a loss of competitiveness in their 
export sector. However, when the current account surplus is not available to 
finance capital outflows; this would mean mounting pressures for devaluation and 
currency crises.  
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Figure 1. Average annual growth rates of GDP per capita and average current account 
balance, 1970-2013 
Source: Calculations based on the World Bank, Development Indicators and IMF, Balance of 
Payments, various years. 
 
 
Figure 2. Average current account balance and capital flows to large developing countries 
(% GDP 2000-2014) 
Source: IMF Balance of Payments; various years, IMF. 
 
The UNDP (2013) report recommends a number of neoliberal policies such as 
further integration with the global markets, to adhere rules of global governance, 
and financial liberalisation. However, the report ignores the fact that increased 
dependence on foreign markets would mean increased vulnerability to the volatile 
nature of global finance, which has been in the recent past marked by speculation, 
capital flights, and economic crises. Such policies would run counter to the 
developing countries aim of economic sovereignty, and also pro-poor, and poverty 
alleviation goals of the economic inclusion agenda. As Soederberg (2015) argues:  
‚[Financial liberalisation] has done little to deliver on the neoliberal promise 
of growth and progress through investments in production and thus the 
creation of stable and sustainable wages and, by extension, poverty reduction. 
Indeed, the increased frequency and intensity of financial debacles has made 
the South, and especially the poor therein, more susceptible to the aftershocks 
of speculative-led accumulation‛ Soederberg (2015:253). 
There has been a rapid increase in capital flows in recent years due to gross 
inflows of private capital from nearly 6% of GDP in 1991 to more than double that 
amount in developing countries in 2013. This was an unprecedented development 
but at the same time it has made these economies more vulnerable to the perils of 
financial globalisation. 
In the post-war period state control over cross-border capital flows was seen to 
be a very important policy measure within the macroeconomic framework. It was 
intended to ensure that the State could act without fear of triggering capital 
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outflows, i.e. not having to be concerned about what disgruntled financiers, who 
might otherwise have taken their funds out, thought of its actions. The Bretton 
Woods system was introduced soon after the Second World War, allowing 
countries to have capital controls, and all of them had such controls in place. In the 
post-war period, capital control, both in the developing and the developed 
countries, was considered to be a normal part of policy measures, seen as essential 
government tools of economic management. Governments deployed capital control 
measures to enhance macroeconomic policies aimed at controlling and promoting 
financial and currency stability. In fact, this form of control was seen as a useful 
tool for promoting industrialization and competitiveness (Grabel, 2006). 
During the period 2000-2007 in particular, developing countries received large 
capital inflows, fuelled by the availability of cheap credit in the developed 
countries and booming commodity prices (Bonizzi, 2014). The experiences of 
nearly two decades of crises including that of Mexico in 1997, East Asia in 1997-
98, and Argentina in 2001, sparked discussions about the need for prudent 
measures to manage capital flows in developing countries. The cycle of boom and 
bust experienced by several developing countries necessitated a clear policy 
regarding how to deal with the capital inflows during the boom and how to respond 
to a situation of sudden and rapid outflows of capital during economic crisis.  
The capital liberalisation of the last two decades has increased consumption and 
output variability. However, if capital inflows are dominated by the portfolio this 
could have adverse consequences for the developing countries. As Stiglitz (2004) 
argues,  
‚Capital market liberalization [in East Asia and Latin America] has played a 
role in contributing to economic instability. Money rushed into the country, 
often financing a consumption binge, and then rushed out; as it left, financial 
institutions were weakened, often bankrupted, and exchange rates 
plummeted, leaving those with dollar-denominated debts hard pressed to 
meet their obligations. During the inflows, the exchange rate appreciates, 
posing problems for the import competing and export sectors. Some 
governments (Thailand in the mid-1990s) attempt to prevent this and at the 
same time, avoid the economy overheating; this necessitates cutting back on 
high-return public investment and raising interest rates […] During the 
outflows, financial institutions are devastated, and the lack of credit 
contributes to the economic downturn‛ (Stiglitz, 2004:63). 
It would be useful here to re-consider the merits of two widely used economic 
formulations, namely the Mundell-Fleming ‚impossible trinity‛ and the Taylor 
Rule of monetary policy. According to Mundell-Fleming, a country can only have 
two of the following three: monetary sovereignty, a fixed exchange rate, and free 
capital flows. The Taylor Rule is bound by which a central bank adjusts its short-
term interest rates based on the differential between a country’s potential and actual 
GDP, and between the inflation target and actual inflation. Developing countries 
may be constrained to respond to the external financial cycle, which could distort 
the Taylor Rule. In fact, if domestic growth concerns warrant low interest rates, a 
sudden fall in capital inflows may induce them to raise interest rates to attract 
foreign capital thereby exacerbating the downturn in the business cycle.   
 
3. IMF Response to Capital Mobility Issue 
The governments of developing countries are consistently told that capital 
control is impossible to enforce or too disruptive of normal global business 
relationships and may also encourage corruption. There is no doubt that IMF 
prescriptions in recent years have shown more flexibility than in the past when 
managing countries in crisis. However, the IMF still lends support to neo-liberal 
strategies and justifies this on the grounds that in the long term such policies will 
help developing countries. Overall its prescriptions on this issue have been 
incoherent.  
In the wake of the East Asian crisis of 1997, many developing countries greatly 
increased their foreign exchange reserve so that they would a bigger cushion in the 
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event of future crisis but this additional reserve is not being used to promote faster 
growth They also have to maintain higher rates of interests because under open 
capital market conditions; capital can leave the country en masse. Higher interest 
rates increase the cost of borrowing, which could discourage local businesses from 
borrowing and investing.  
A few developing countries have imposed capital controls as a means of 
protecting domestic economies from the effects of global liberalised financial 
markets and in recent years the IMF has been less critical about such policies. 
However, this can be contrasted with its response when Malaysia imposed capital 
control during the East Asian crisis in the late 1990s. Then the IMF referred to this 
control of capital outflows as a backwards step and one IMF representative stated 
that ‘foreign investors in Malaysia have been expropriated, and the Malaysians will 
bear the cost of their distrust for years’ (cited in Kaplan & Rodrik, 2001:11). In 
December 2006, capital controls in Thailand were reversed after only a few days 
by its Central Bank when a military coup replaced the previous elected government 
and such measures immediately triggered massive capital flights from the country. 
The Chilean government also undertook measures aimed at controlling capital 
inflows, requiring foreign investors to keep their investment in the country for at 
least one year, and a percentage of the investment to be placed in an interest-free 
deposit with the central bank. Such policies certainly can impact on short-term debt 
(Crotty & Epstein, 1999). When South Korea removed capital control on short-
term foreign bank borrowing, but imposed restrictions on long-term capital inflows 
such as foreign purchases of stocks and foreign direct investments, large scale 
borrowing by their banks resulted in the 1997 East Asian financial crisis (Chang & 
Grabel, 2014). 
Excessive short-term foreign currency inflows could take place because local 
banks may borrow a lot of overseas capital. In such circumstances, imposing 
capital control may help to establish the supervision and regulation of the country’s 
financial system. Some argue that such provisions may be less effective in the long 
term, as investors and borrowers may find ways to undermine such regulations 
(Magud & Reinhart, 2006). 
It is interesting to analyse Iceland’s experience of financial policy, since the 
country was advised to adopt capital control as a short-term strategy. It was the 
first country to sign the Small Business Act (SBA) for Europe which is the EU’s 
flagship policy initiative to support small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). It 
comprises a set of policy measures ranging from ‘entrepreneurship’ and 
‘responsive administration’ to ‘internationalisation’. To improve governance and 
entrepreneurship during the financial crisis in 2008, the SBA was the first financial 
rescue measure in the Western Europe since that of the UK in 1976. Iceland 
initially approached its Scandinavian neighbours for help and then Russia in 2008. 
When all these efforts failed, some Western European countries suggested that it 
should negotiate an arrangement with the IMF, which the country did in the late 
autumn of 2008. The SBA negotiation provisions recommended that Iceland 
should adopt stringent capital control measures, the deputy managing director of 
the IMF emphasising that it should make capital control an essential feature of the 
monetary policy framework, given the scale of potential capital outflows. Iceland 
initially imposed capital control prior to signing of SBA in October 2008 and the 
IMF recommended that it was a necessity to maintain financial stability (Reinhart 
& Rogoff, 2011). 
In 1991, the Icelandic government began to adopt neo-liberal economic policies 
including privatisation of public assets. Stock markets and the housing sector 
experienced massive growth, and all these combined effects made Iceland’s per 
capita GDP one of the world’s highest by the 2006. However, in 2008 its economy 
collapsed, when the country’s three largest banks were forced to declare 
bankruptcy, and its GDP shrank sharply. 
Until the late 1980s, Iceland’s largest banks were state-owned and as a result 
capital was rationed amongst different sectors and industries. The government 
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fixed nominal interest rates, and the Central Bank of Iceland (CBI) was seen to be 
implementing government policies. However, banks were largely managed with 
the aim of benefitting political parties and market forces were introduced to break 
the stranglehold of the domestic economy. These steps were taken because state 
ownership of banks and other big businesses placed limits on the profit 
opportunities of the capitalist class in general and therefore, privatisation in the 
1990s was seen as a good avenue for investors. 
In the late 1980s, real interest rates were low and even negative for a long 
period in Iceland’s government-owned banks. As a result, credit demands soared 
with banks allocating credit to favoured businesses. This resulted in inefficiencies 
in resource allocation and debts rose relative to equity. 
 
4. Capital Flows and Monetary Policies 
Monetary theory predicts that when the exchange rate is fixed, capital flows will 
equalise domestic and international interest rates, in a situation when monetary 
policy is losing its ability to influence domestic activity. Similarly Obstfeld and 
Taylor have supported the view that it is impossible to maintain free capital flows, 
a fixed exchange rate and an independent monetary policy at the same time 
(Williamson, 2007). 
At the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944, where the new post-war economic 
policies were agreed, J. M. Keynes said the single most important achievement 
agreed was that all countries should have the right to restrict capital movements, 
provided that the restrictions were not aimed at restricting trade. Keynes strongly 
believed that the earlier crises, such as the Great Depression and the Second World 
War, owed a great deal to the volatility induced by free capital movements. 
Therefore, according to him, the benefits of trade would be at risk if countries were 
to remove capital control. 
The US dollar is the dominant international currency. At present about three-
quarters of the total global currency reserves are held in US dollars. The US has the 
biggest and most liquid capital market in the world but this is continuously 
maintained and supplied by US deficit financing. The US has also put all its efforts 
into encouraging the rest of the world to open their capital accounts and remove all 
impediments to the inflows and outflows of capital. In the name of neo-liberal 
reforms, all forms of social control of the markets are reduced (Siddiqui, 2009a, 
Zhang, 2009). 
Another major discrepancy is that the macroeconomic policies applicable in the 
case of developed countries were too often recommended to developing countries, 
despite the fact that the economic structures, institutions and capital markets of the 
latter group are very different from those of the former Mishkin (2004). identifies 
the difficulties faced by developing countries as being weak fiscal institutions, 
weak financial institutions including government regulation and vulnerability to 
sudden variations in capital flows. 
It is argued that financial integration allows domestic businesses in developing 
countries to borrow in anticipation of future incomes. Following such arguments 
led to the opening up of their capital accounts to international finance. However, it 
was soon realised that asset markets are different from goods markets, and in 
addition financial markets in developing countries are different from those in their 
developed counterparts.  
On the issue of outward-looking industrialization policy, Sen (2007:293-94) 
argues that, ‚Japan and Korea had almost no foreign direct investment (FDI) flows, 
while others such as Singapore, and later China, had these in ample quantities… 
and the absence of any portfolio flows in the early stages of development. But the 
sharp contradictions in the fast growing economies of Asia, India liberalised both 
the current-and capital-account components of its balance of payments… this in 
spite of evidence showing that those who opened their capital accounts to anything 
more than FDI quickly landed themselves in trouble as in the Latin America‛. 
Malaysia undertook capital control measures in 1998 to prevent capital flight and 
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
 JEPE, 4(1), K. Siddiqui, p.14-32. 
22 
22 
increase its control over the domestic capital market and exchange rate value of its 
currency. The government adopted a number of measures in monetary and fiscal 
policies to address the domestic imbalances and to deal with the recession 
(Siddiqui, 2009b). Malaysia’s control policies have produced a faster economic 
recovery, a lower reduction in employment, and a quicker turnaround in the stock 
market. Kaplan & Rodrik (2001) analysed how Malaysia was able to achieve this 
better performance and control capital flight in comparison to South Korea and 
Thailand. They found that unlike Thailand and South Korea where interest rates 
fell sharply, in Malaysia interest rates remained stable due to a ceiling of 2.5% 
points over the base lending rate. The Malaysian government was careful to target 
short-term speculative capital inflows, while insulating capital inflows. Malaysia 
recovered from the East Asian crisis more quickly and its exchange rates were 
stabilised, while those countries, which adopted the orthodox policies experienced 
a longer and deeper crisis. Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed was 
criticised for going against the region’s widely accepted liberalisation policies 
(Siddiqui, 2012). 
With capital control the government in Malaysia can pursue its domestic 
economic policies without the worries of a balance of payments crisis. Speculative 
attacks in East Asia and Mexico were fuelled by large movements in inflows and 
outflows of capital. The Malaysian government set a limit on capital outflows in 
1998 to help the economy and to regain financial stability. 
Gallagher’s (2014) cross-country study found that among the East Asian 
countries, those that had applied capital control were able to perform better. Similar 
results were found by the other empirical studies (Magud & Reinhart, 2006). The 
Malaysian response to the East Asian financial crisis of 1997 offers an interesting 
lesson since soon after the crisis the country witnessed a rise in state ownership, as 
large numbers of family-owned enterprises were merged into state-owned firms. 
The differences between President Mahathir and his deputy Anwar Ibrahim 
become open, resulting in the removal of Ibrahim in 1998. As a result, Mahathir 
consolidated his power and all those businesses seen to be close to Ibrahim lost 
government favour. The government increased its grip over the corporate sector 
and banks, and ultimately influenced lending and credit policies with further shifts 
towards government-owned companies. Capital controls were aimed at minimising 
the risks of exit by large-scale investors, currency conversion by domestic and 
foreign asset holders and the risks associated with cross-border derivate (Gallagher, 
2014; Stiglitz, 2004). These measures were intended to enhance the autonomy of 
domestic policy and to insulate the domestic economy from crises in other 
countries.  
However, the problem is the experiences of developing countries in the late 
1970s, when the huge accumulation of liquidity in the banks based in developed 
countries led them to increase their lending and investment in the developing 
countries. Soon after the debt crisis in the 1980s, the East Asian financial crisis of 
1997 and more recently the global financial crisis of 2008, all made it clear that 
capital deregulation could lead to the loss of domestic sovereignty in 
macroeconomic policy, leading to a balance of payment crisis, currency instability, 
and capital flight.  
Financial deregulation has two elements: liberalization of international capital 
flows and deregulation of domestic financial systems. This has led to dramatic 
change in the financial sector. These changes have given rise to sharp rise in the 
financial speculation activities and also such development has strengthened the 
influence of financial in the economy. In fact, the deregulation and removal of 
control on international capital flows has created a situation where countries could 
run large current account deficits (or surplus). This also has opened the possibility 
of a debt-led growth model and as a result a consumption boom. A country’s 
exchange rates are often seen to be determined by capital flows rather than trade 
balances. Capital flows have often financial motives and are pro-cycle. As 
Stockhammer (2015) emphasises that:  
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‚The deregulation of international capital flows has loosened external trade 
constraints. It has allowed countries to run larger current account deficits for 
longer periods... episodes of strong capital inflows (capital flow bonanzas) 
usually come with speculative bubbles on financial and property markets and 
typically end in recessions. Financial globalization has thus ironically 
increased the room for different developments across countries. Current 
account imbalances can be maintained for longer - essentially as long as 
markets trust the situation‛ (Stockhammer, 2015:943). 
Financial liberalisation expands access to capital via greater inflow of capital 
such as foreign direct investment, portfolio flows and other types of capital 
movements. The developed countries also demand international standards on 
governing capital accounts, financial markets, exchange rates, accounting systems 
and banking operations (Siddiqui, 2015a). Another major difficulty with capital 
liberalisation is that it brings increased dependence on monetary policy of 
international financial institutions such as the Federal Reserve and the European 
Central Bank. Low interest rates can flood developing countries with liquidity, 
heightening the risks for their economies when a tightening policy is imposed. A 
sudden slowdown in growth rates in international economies may lead to political 
unrest and chaos, which is not of their making (Siddiqui, 2015b). 
Hence in the age of global finance the issue of creditworthiness has become a 
matter of importance for governments and it may be seen as prudent to pursue only 
those policies that are approved or in line with global finance. Governments do not 
want to see sudden outflows and panic in the financial markets which may prove 
disastrous for the national economy (Epstein, 2005a). In fact, the liberalisation of 
capital’s social obligations, such as priority sector lending targets and changes in 
differential interest rates, could have adverse consequences particularly for SMEs 
leading to a rise in unemployment (Siddiqui, 2014c). The government is obliged to 
defend large and global businesses and financial interests.  
 
5. Experiences of Capital Liberalisation 
After the global financial crisis in 2008 many developing countries imposed 
capital control with the aim to regulate capital flows, especially to reduce foreign 
capital going into speculation. This step was supposed to help to keep inflationary 
pressures and pressures on currency appreciation under control.  
In December 2007, Taiwan imposed restrictions on capital inflows with the aim 
of minimising speculative pressures from overseas investors (Zhang, 2009). 
Similarly, in June 2015, Argentina imposed capital control and government charges 
of 6% were imposed on overseas investors. The experiences of Latin American 
countries in the 1990s tell us that the lack of macroeconomic balance-budget turned 
into current-account deficits. This suggests that inadequate regulation and 
supervision of the financial sector can have disastrous consequences. 
It seems that the mercantilist strategy of the East Asian countries rather than the 
open capital account policy of Latin America is preferable for developing 
economies. India’s capital account was opened to capital inflows on the grounds 
this would accelerate growth and investment, but its continuing trade deficit owing 
to the absence of real depreciation is a drag on the growth in income (Ghosh & 
Chandrasekhar, 2009). Moreover, foreign capital inflows have not led to an 
investment boom in India. Klein (2012:4) argues that ‚There may be political 
reasons that make it difficult to impose capital controls during booms‛.  As the 
financial system is becoming increasingly integrated, it appears that the time 
horizons of FDI and portfolio capital investment are quite different. FDI is 
generally seen as long term while portfolio investment implies a narrower 
timespan. 
When Aizenman & Pasricha (2013) analysed the macroeconomic causes of 
changes in capital control on capital outflows in 22 emerging economies, they 
found that these were: fiscal concerns, overheating concerns, foreign exchange 
valuation concerns, macroeconomic stability and financial stability concerns. They 
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concluded that the decision to liberalise capital concerns was related to net capital 
inflows such as higher appreciation pressure in the exchange market, and the 
accumulation of reserves. The currency appreciation generated by an upsurge in 
capital inflows can decrease export competitiveness and have an adverse impact on 
the manufacturing sector and employment situation within a country. The national 
government can fight exchange rate appreciation by accumulating international 
reserves.  
Epstein (2005b) defines financialization as,‚The increasing role of financial 
motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the 
operation of domestic and international economics‛ (Epstein, 2005b:4). He further 
says that the predominant form of capital is financial capital, since the financial 
sector has displaced the real or productive sector, relegating it to a subordinate 
position. Financialization works differently in countries where the financial system 
is based on capital markets and banking structures, and in developing countries 
these systems are unlikely to converge with Anglo-American market economies. 
The export sectors of developing countries are not able to attain current account 
surplus and they may find it increasingly difficult to attract capital inflows to 
balance their external sector. Therefore, in such circumstances these countries have 
to offer increased financial returns to foreign capital investors and lower wages in 
order for foreign markets to compete in the world market (Epstein, 2005a). 
Prior to the 1981 economic crisis, Mexico followed import-substitution 
industrialisation (ISI), which produced a deep crisis and led to the dismantling of 
the government’s interventionist policies. Among the economic reforms adopted, 
the government began with a de-regulation programme aimed at introducing 
‘efficiency’ into the banking sector and reducing government intervention in the 
financial sector. Later, in 1990, the globalisation of Mexico’s financial system took 
place and its capital market was opened to foreign portfolio investments. Finally, in 
2000, with the further implementation of NAFTA, which was signed in 1994, 
Mexico adopted financial innovation, creating the conditions for securitization 
activities and greater involvement of both foreign international banks and 
corporations. As a result, these foreign companies increased their control over the 
banking and non-banking sectors such as investment banks, insurance companies 
and pension funds (Levy-Orlik, 2014). 
The major activity of the foreign companies operating in the Mexico’s financial 
sector was to advance credits; however the availability of more capital did not 
benefit its economy. As Levy-Orlik (2014:113-114) notes:  
‚The Mexican economy has not benefitted from greater access to credit. On 
the contrary, Mexico has the lowest ratio of credit to GDP (an average 14%) 
among Latin American countries. Small and medium-size businesses 
constitute an important sector that has reduced credit availability, partly 
because these businesses have little to no credit history or collateral and are 
therefore unable to guarantee payment in case of default. While the dynamic 
part of credit (channelled to households) has expanded, its share continues to 
be relatively small‛  Levy-Orlik (2014:113-114). 
The manufacturing sector, which had an important role under previous ISI 
strategies due to the adoption of NAFTA and market policies, did not experience 
drastic changes. Despite the increase in exports in the post-NAFTA period, the 
export sector was unable to achieve a surplus. Analysis of the country’s foreign 
trade deficit shows that the manufacturing sector deficit is higher than its total trade 
deficit. Despite the fall in overall investment spending, those manufacturing 
industries specialising in exports of high technology have done well, while the 
traditional manufacturing industries have experienced a sharp decline in exports. 
The high tech industries are based on the maquiladora structure, which specialises 
in assembling goods that have strong import content and thus, to increase exports, 
imports must go up (Levy-Orlik, 2014). In Mexico, the banking sector has 
experienced profound institutional changes as bank ownership was transferred to 
foreign corporations, who took advantage of oligopolistic banking structures to 
gain further control over this sector. During this period of financialization and 
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capital liberalisation the inflows of foreign capital and portfolio have increased, but 
to attract this international capital Mexico had to offer higher financial returns than 
those available on the global financial markets.  
Brazil increased its interest rates, as it felt it was necessary to stop capital 
outflows, which could have an adverse impact on output and employment. Despite 
removing tax on capital inflows in 2008, the Brazilian government re-imposed 2% 
tax on portfolio inflows in late 2009 (BCB, 2014). These were modest efforts, 
aimed at slowing down the appreciation of the currency in the face of capital 
inflows into the country (Ostry, et al. 2010; Sen, 2007). 
In the 1990s Brazil began to accelerate the linkage of its financial systems with 
global finance. When Lula took over as president, he simply followed the measures 
taken previously by Cardoso’s government to prepare the Brazilian economy to 
participate fully in global finances. Since the 2000s, efforts were made to ensure 
the country’s close cooperation with global finances in order to offer high profits 
and it was realised that not trade but finance helped Brazil to integrate with the 
world economy. The Lula government took measures to consolidate the country’s 
position as a provider of cheap assets in the name of attracting finances. This 
becomes much clearer, if we consider the interest on foreign payments. This 
amount increased from US$ 12 billion in 1990 to US$ 21 billion in 2002, then US$ 
29 billion in 2005, finally reaching more than US$ 35 billion in 2007. Growth in 
portfolio investment has been impressive increasing rapidly from US$ 400 million 
in 1990 to US$ 8 billion 2002 and US$ 13 billion in 2007. (Kaltenbrunner & 
Painceira, 2015) and the stocks of productive and financial assets owned by the 
non-residential have grown rapidly (BCB, 2014). Brazil’s exports remained 
technologically backward and insufficiently dynamic in terms of world trade, 
becoming increasingly dominated by the agrarian sector, minerals and steel. In 
these sectors Brazil has the competitive edge because of low wages and its 
abundant natural resources, especially land and water. 
Thailand imposed capital control in May 1997 and the aim was to stabilise 
foreign exchange and dampen speculative activities, as it was viewed that using 
interest rates as a means to defend the bhat. However, soon it was found that 
government measures were not comprehensive enough to eliminate the speculative 
pressure on the baht. As Edison & Reinhart (2000) study on capital control of 
Thailand (1997) and Malaysia (1998-99) find different results for both countries. 
Their studies focused on economic performance, foreign exchange reserves and 
capital flows, which concludes that:  
‚[It] emerges from our empirical work is that the controls used in Thailand 
did not appear to deliver much of what they were intended. By contrast, in 
the case of Malaysia, the controls did align more closely with the priors of 
what controls were intended to achieve – namely greater interest rate and 
exchange rate stability and more policy autonomy – although initially, at 
least, these measures did not prevent mutual funds from exiting the country… 
The results do suggest that the timing of capital controls and the types of 
controls that are plied might have something to do with the success of 
controls‛ (Edison & Reinhart, 2000:20). 
During periods of financial crisis developing countries such as Brazil, 
Colombia, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea and Thailand have all used various 
capital control measures to control capital flows, especially short-term and 
speculative ones entering the country that could have had adverse effects on their 
economies in terms of asset markets and exchange rates. South Korea’s currency, 
the Won, appreciated rapidly in 2008 and the government set a limit on speculative 
capital and levied an outflow tax on capital gains of foreign purchases of 
government bonds. In return for financial assistance from the IMF, Thailand and 
South Korea adopted neoliberal reforms meaning that fiscal spending was reduced 
and interest rates were adjusted in the line with market-determined rates. 
An IMF study on capital control measures has provided some guidelines for 
member countries designed to minimise currency appreciation and asset bubbles 
during the 2008 international financial crisis (IMF, 2012). However, such 
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
 JEPE, 4(1), K. Siddiqui, p.14-32. 
26 
26 
recommendations were given under special circumstances. Ostry et al.’s (2010) 
study supported the policy of capital control to shorten the recession period. They 
also find that ‚such controls, moreover, can retain their potency even if investors 
devise strategies to bypass them […] the cost of circumvention strategies act like 
sand in the wheels‛ (Ostry, et al., 2010:5). 
After independence from Britain in 1947, India embarked on a policy of 
‘import-substitution’, in which industrialisation with the state playing a leading 
role was the ‘commanding height’ of the economy (Siddiqui, 2014a). In 1969, 
India’s then Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, took a populist measure by 
nationalising fourteen commercial banks and a decade later, there was rising 
inefficiency in public sector organisations, which were allowed to borrow at high 
interest rates from these government-owned banks. All these strategies did not 
bring any long term solutions. However, in the 1980s, the Indian economy began to 
open up to foreign capital and envisaged a greater role for foreign trade. These 
market-oriented policies became more obvious in 1991, when India approached the 
IMF for a bail-out and in return accepted further implementation of neoliberal 
economic reforms that included opening up its economy for goods and capital, 
privatization of public industries and a roll-back in state involvement in the 
economy (Siddiqui, 2014b). However, with increasing economic crisis in the 
1980s, India moved towards assigning a greater role to foreign capital and overseas 
businesses, and significantly eased its capital control policy. Growing criticism of 
government financial repression to improve the performance of the financial sector 
led to formation of the government appointed Narsimham Committee in 1991 
which recommended relaxing the interest rate ceilings amongst other things. To 
increase competition, foreign and domestic banks were allowed to operate. Foreign 
capital inflows were encouraged and the companies were allowed to remit their 
principal, dividends and profits and sales proceeds (Siddiqui, 2009a). 
Since early 1990s, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has moved towards market-
oriented economic policies. Under such policies, issues related to the monetary 
transmission mechanism have gained increased importance (Siddiqui, 2009b). The 
central banks in developing countries take into account the foreign variables when 
setting their monetary policies. Often they have taken debts in foreign currencies, 
such as US dollars, and hence any default can make the situation worse than that of 
the central banks in these countries, so often the policy was to let the exchange rate 
fluctuate freely. Monetary policy in developing countries is constrained by the 
international banks such as Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank and Bank 
of Japan. Foreign trade is also primarily invoiced in US dollars; therefore, any 
drastic variations in exchange rates could have adverse effects on foreign trade. For 
these reasons, central banks in developing countries try to stabilise exchange rates 
without explicitly stating this. Since 2005, in India bank credit to the commercial 
sector has accounted for more than 70% of total domestic credit. The currency to 
deposit ratio has declined since 1999. It is also known that in India the bank plays a 
role in financial intermediation and that the non-financial sector lacks alternative 
sources of funding (Aleem, 2010; Siddiqui, 2015a). Compared to those of 
developed countries, India’s capital markets are insufficiently developed. Thus, the 
central bank (i.e. RBI) stabilizes the exchange rate via interventions. 
There may be a reason why capital account convertibility may not be in the 
interest of an economy such as India. This may be due to government fiscal deficit, 
public debt and the capability of the financial sector to handle outflows. The budget 
deficit could then be transformed into a current account deficit and could possibly 
cause large depreciation. Capital inflows (except short-term debt) have been 
liberalised, meaning that quantitative restrictions have been removed and there are 
no bars to repatriation of both principal and return on these flows (Ghosh & 
Chandrasekhar, 2009). 
Since the early 1990s, RBI has adopted market-oriented monetary policies, and 
controls lending through its monetary policy instrument. Prior to 1996, it only used 
quality instruments to control the amount of bank loans and the priority lending 
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instrument was to meet the lending target in line with the ‘government’s 
developmental goals’. However, since 1997 the RBI has used the price instruments 
to indirectly control the amount of bank loans but also uses priority sector lending 
targets. 
India took further measures to control capital in mid-2007, which were aimed at 
reducing the volume of capital inflows and the appreciation of the Rupee, 
discouraging portfolio capital inflows and decreasing the volatility on the Mumbai 
stock exchange. Balin concluded that for various reasons these measures achieved 
very little. He pointed out that the majority of the government’s stated goals were 
unattainable and investors were able to circumvent the capital control measures. 
During this period, corruption and favouritism was rampant within the RBI and 
securities and in practice the policy tilted in favour of large corporations (Balin, 
2008). 
Since the early 1980s, many developing countries have adopted measures of 
capital liberalization and these policies should be seen against the broader context 
of the global policy change in favour of market-friendly development strategies, 
also known in developing countries as the ‘Structural Adjustment Programme’, a 
policy recommended by the IMF and the World Bank (Bonizzi, 2014). 
The ascendancy of finance has sought to reduce the autonomy of national 
decisions and control over monetary and fiscal policies. At present, developing 
economies are very vulnerable and the short-term capital flows that follow capital 
liberalization can lead to further economic fluctuations, inhibiting government 
ability to counter such tendencies that arise from outside sources (Crotty & 
Epstein, 1999). 
The year 2015 was a difficult one for emerging markets, since not only did 
exports of goods and services decline but they even turned negative for some 
previously buoyant exporters. It was also a time when capital flow reversed the 
course. IMF data shows that net capital flows into developing Asia declined 
significantly in 2014, marking a shift from the previous boom period for emerging 
markets, especially those in Asia. However, it appears that 2015 was even more 
devastating for emerging markets across the world, including those in Asia. Figure 
3 illustrates how serious the swings in capital flows were. 
 
 
Figure 3. Net Capital Flows to/from Emerging Asia (US$ billion) 
Source: IMF. 2016. Institute of International Finance, ‚Capital Flows to Emerging Markets‛, 19 
January, IIF: Washington D.C. 
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Figure 4. Change in Reserves and Current Account Balance in Emerging Asia (US$ billion) 
Source: IMF. 2016. Institute of International Finance, ‚Capital Flows to Emerging Markets‛, 19 
January, IIF: Washington D.C. 
 
With the on-going global economic crisis, it is clear that capital flight from the 
emerging countries of Asia, for example, has risen sharply as shown in Figure 3. 
Taking the total of net inflows from non-residents into emerging markets across all 
regions minus the total of net capital outflows made by residents, and adding the 
effect of errors and omissions, the reports show a surprisingly large figure of US$ 
735 billion net capital outflow in 2015, compared to a net outflow of US$ 111 
billion for the previous year. Much of this was driven by China, where net capital 
outflow in 2015 amounted to US$ 676 billion, including US$ 216 billion in 
unrecorded net outflows. However, even excluding China, emerging markets as a 
group experienced negative capital flows in both 2014 and 2015 (IMF, 2016). With 
regard to the foreign exchange reserves in the BRIC countries between 1991 and 
2015 (as shown in Figure 5). 
 
 
Figure 5. Foreign Exchange Reserves of BRICS countries, US$ billion 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators; various years. 
 
When we look at China’s per capita income, the figure is quite impressive. 
However, despite the optimism and rapid growth in recent decades projected by a 
number of studies, as shown in Figure 6, the average per capita income is quite low 
among the BRIC countries compared to that of G7 countries. The GDP per capita 
does not reflect the differences in the cost of living, but increases in GDP per capita 
can indicate rises in productivity growth and also growth in the economy of a 
country. GDP per capita in India and China relative to US was as low as 3% in 
1960. India’s relative GDP was 3% of that of the US in 2010, but China’s GDP per 
capita more than doubled to 8% for the same year, as shown in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6. Per Capita Income Growth for China and US 
Source: The Economist, 2015; OECD, 2015 
 
The net capital inflows from non-residents to all emerging markets remained 
positive in 2015 at an estimated US$ 293 billion. However, the more significant 
factor was that residents of these emerging markets took their money elsewhere: 
net private capital outflows by residents amounted to as much as US$ 824 billion, 
and the trend was evident in terms of both foreign equity investment and lending 
patterns. Unrecorded flows in the form of errors and omissions contributed to this 
haemorrhaging, amounting to as much as US$ 206 billion. Figure 4 indicates the 
dramatic swings in the direction of net capital flows that have occurred in just three 
years. Net non-resident capital inflows into these seven Asian countries declined 
from nearly US$ 700 billion in 2013 to an estimated negative figure of around US$ 
18 billion in 2015 (IMF, 2016). 
The net inflow of US$ 98 billion in 2013 has become a net outflow of as much 
as US$ 216 billion estimated for 2015. Once again this is hugely driven by what is 
happening in China in terms of unrecorded capital flight – the IIF estimates Errors 
and Omissions in the Chinese balance of payments to be greater than US$ 200 
billion in 2015. Figure 4 shows that the estimated current account surplus in China 
for 2015 is US$ 270 billion, but in fact of these Asian countries, only India and 
Indonesia showed a deterioration in their current account balances (which were 
already in deficit) between 2014 and 2015 (IMF, 2016). The other countries 
experienced slight improvements in their current account balances - but this did not 
prevent the substantial capital outflow.  
The Minsky’s criticism of capital account liberalisation directs us towards rent-
seeking and speculation, which are expected to increase with the rise of cross-
border capital flows in the developing countries (Minsky, 1986). It means that 
financial de-regulation could lead to financial instability. As Mitchell & 
Toporowski (2014) note:  
‚[Financial] deregulation is deemed to be an exogenous policy choice 
imposed on developing countries at the behest of the International Monetary 
Fund for the convenience of international banks. This forced liberalization is 
supposed to be the key issue for the political economy‛ (Mitchell & 
Toporowski, 2014: 76). 
In fact, in the developing countries, the capital market operates under more 
complex system of corporate finance including multinational corporations, public 
enterprises and relatively small number of domestic private enterprises, who are 
more vulnerable to foreign capital inflows (Levy, 2012). 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
It is argued here that restrictions on capital mobility will enable developing 
countries to exercise monetary autonomy and stable exchange rates. In the face of 
the 2008 global financial crisis, India and China, for instance, slowed down their 
plans to liberalise their capital account (Siddiqui, 2010). India, like China, has not 
fully liberalised capital flows and short-term debt inflows in particular have 
remained under tight control. Even this did help them maintain stability during the 
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global financial crisis of the 2008 (Siddiqui, 2015b). In order to reduce the 
frequency of financial crises, developing countries need to take measures towards 
controlling capital inflows. These could be applied by a number of methods such as 
to limiting inflows or prohibiting capital entry into the country.  
Moreover, such controls might reduce the risk of financial crisis as they should 
prevent large inflows and also reduce excessive lending and short-term speculation 
and borrowing. Capital control is also expected to reduce the risk of sudden capital 
outflows if foreign capital decides to pull out of the country. If anything can be 
learnt from past experiences, these show that capital controls are important 
macroeconomic measures that a country can use to prevent and mitigate financial 
crisis. It seems that the essence of financial liberalisation is to ensure the 
stranglehold of finance over government control in developing countries, for 
although we live a world where countries remain nation-states, the reality is that 
capital is globalised (Chang & Grabel, 2014). The policies should be subject to 
broader debate and checks. Here is this context the question, what is the social 
benefit of capital inflows one that is directly addressed in policy formulations that 
then needs to be regulated, as Joan Robinson warned: ‚It is easy enough to make 
models on stated assumptions. The difficulty is to find the assumptions that are 
relevant to reality… Even if the crises that are looming up are overcome and a new 
run of prosperity leis a head, deeper problem will still remain. Modern capitalism 
has no purpose except to keep the show going… It should be the duty of 
economists to do their best to enlighten the public about the economic aspects of 
these menacing problems‛ (Robinson, 1971:142-43). 
This study has found that financial liberalisation strengthens international 
capital; moreover, by assigning complete authority of the central banks, 
governments have little policy control over monetary and exchange rate. Increased 
power is transformed to bureaucrats and financiers who control international 
financial institutions. With the on-going global economic crisis facing the 
emerging Asian economies as a group, foreign exchange reserves declined by 
nearly US$ 400 billion, but not all countries showed the same trends in declining 
reserves. In China alone, the foreign exchange reserves are estimated to have 
declined by US$ 405 billion over this period, which is still a relatively small drop 
considering that at the start of the year the country held more than US$ 4 trillion of 
such reserves. 
The study suggests that to protect the developing economies from the instability 
associated with the financial globalisation some degree of capital control is 
required. A new situation arises where during the sudden change in the 
international economy and it is important to know how to prevent shockwaves 
from affecting the economy. Those economies which are integrated into the 
international capital may prove to be at the mercy of external forces, in the absence 
of any control on capital and exchange rates. There is no doubt that in such 
circumstances capital control seems to be a useful tool for controlling capital 
movements and maintaining economic stability and sustainable growth in the 
developing countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
 JEPE, 4(1), K. Siddiqui, p.14-32. 
31 
31 
References  
Aizenman, J. & Pasricha, G.K. (2013). Why do emerging markets liberalise capital outflows control: 
fiscal vs net capital flows concerns, NBER Working Paper, No.18879. doi. 10.3386/w18879 
Aleem, A. (2010). Transmission mechanism of monetary policy in India, Journal of Asian 
Economics, 21(2), 186-197. doi. 10.1016/j.asieco.2009.10.001 
Arestis, P. & Glickman, M. (2002). Financial crisis in South East Asia: Dispelling illusion the 
Minskyan way, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 26(2), 237-260. doi. 10.1093/cje/26.2.237 
Balin, B.J. (2008). India’s New Capital Restrictions: what they are, why they were created and have 
they been effective? School of Advanced International Studies, John Hopkins University: 
Washington D.C. 
Bond, P., & Garcia, A. (eds.) (2015). BRICS: An anti-capitalist critique, London, Pluto Press 
Bonizzi, B. (2014). Financialization in the developing and emerging countries, International Journal 
of Political Economy, 42(4), 83-107. doi. 10.2753/IJP0891-1916420405 
Central Bank of Brazil, (BCB). (2014). Economic Indicators, [Retrieved from]. 
Chang, H.-J., & Grabel, I. (2014). Reclaiming Development: An Alternative Economic Policy 
Manual, London: Zed Books. 
Crotty, J., & Epstein, G. (1999). A defence of capital control in the light of Asian financial crisis, 
Journal of Economic Issues, 33(2), 427-33. doi. 10.1080/00213624.1999.11506174 
Dymski, G. (2010). Why the subprime crisis is different: a Minskyian approach, Cambridge Journal 
of Economics, 34(2), 239-255. doi. 10.1093/cje/bep054  
Edison, H.J. & Reinhart, C.M. (2000). Capital Controls During Financial Crises: The case of 
Malaysia and Thailand. The Federal Reserve Boar, International Finance Discussion Papers, 
No.2000-662. [Retrieved from]. 
Epstein, G. (2005a).Capitals Control in Developing Countries, Cheltenham UK: Edward Elgar 
Epstein, G. (2005b). Introduction, in G. Epstein (edi) Financialization and the World Economy, (pp.3-
16), Cheltenham UK: Edward Elgar  
Feldstein, M., & Horioka, C. (1980). Domestic saving and international capital flows, Economic 
Journal, 90(358), 314-329. doi. 10.2307/2231790  
Gallagher, K. (2014). Countervailing monetary policy: Re-regulating capital flows in Brazil and 
South Korea, Review in International Political Economy, 22(1), 77-102. doi. 
10.1080/09692290.2014.915577 
Ghosh, J., & Chandrasekhar, C.P. (2009). The costs of ‘coupling’: The global crisis and the Indian 
economy, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 33(4), 725-739. doi. 10.1093/cje/bep034  
Girdner, E.J., & Siddiqui, K. (2008). Neoliberal globalization, poverty creation and environmental 
degradation in developing countries, International Journal of Environment and Development, 
5(1), 1-27. 
Grabel, I. (2006). International private capital flows and developing countries, in H.-J. Chang (Ed.) 
Rethinking Development Economics, (pp.324-345), London: Anthem. 
International Monetary Fund, (2016). Capital Flows to Emerging Markets, IIF,19thJanuary, 
Washington D.C: IMF. 
International Monetary Fund, (2012). Liberalising Capital Flows and Managing Outflows, 
Washington D.C.: IMF. 
Kaltenbrunner, A., & Painceira, J.P. (2015). Developing countries’ changing nature of financial 
integration and new forms of external vulnerability: The Brazilian experience, Cambridge Journal 
of Economics, 39(5), 1281-1306. doi. 10.1093/cje/beu038  
Kaplan, E., & Rodrik, D. (2001). Did the Malaysian Capital Control Works? NBER Working Paper, 
No.8142. doi. 10.3386/w8142 
Klein, M.W. (2012). Capital Control: Gates and Walls, Brookings Institution, NBER Working Paper, 
No.18526. doi. 10.3386/w18526 
Levy, N. (2012). Financial markets in developing countries, in J. Toporowsk  & J. Mitchell (Eds.), 
Handbook of Critical Issues in Finance, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Levy-Orlik, N. (2014). Financialization and economic growth in developing countries: The case of 
Mexican economy, International Journal of Political Economy, 42(4), 108-127. 
Magud, N. & Reinhart, C.M. 2006.Capital Control: An Evaluation, NBER Working Paper No.11973. 
doi. 10.3386/w11973 
Minsky, H.P. (1986). Stabilizing and Unstable Economy, New Haven CT: Yale University Press. 
Mishkin, F.S. (2004). Can inflation targeting work in emerging market countries?, NBER Working 
Paper No.10646. doi. 10.3386/w10646  
Mitchell, J. & Toporowski, J. (2014). Critical observation on financialization and the financial 
process, International Journal of Political Economy, 42(4), 67-82. doi. 10.2753/IJP0891-
191640404 
Obstfeld, M. (1998). The global capital market: Benefactor or menace?, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 12(4), 9-30. 
Ocampo, J.A. & Stiglitz, J.E. (2008). Capital Markets Liberalization and Development, New York: 
Oxford University Press 
Ostry, J.D., Loungani, P. & Furceri, D. (2016). Neoliberalism: Oversold?, Finance & Development, 
53(4), 9-30. 
Ostry, J.D., Ghosh, A.R., Habermeier, K., Chamon, M., Qureshi, M.S., & Reinhardt, D.B.S. (2010). 
Capital Inflows: The Role of Control, IMF, SPN.10/04. [Retrieved from]. 
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
 JEPE, 4(1), K. Siddiqui, p.14-32. 
32 
32 
Reinhart, C.M., & Rogoff, K.S. (2011). From financial crash to debt crisis, American Economic 
Review, 101(5), 1676–1706. doi. 10.1257/aer.101.5.1676 
Robinson, J. (1971). Economic Heresies: Old Fashioned Questions in Economic Theory, Basingstoke, 
Macmillan.  
Sen, P. (2007). Capital inflows, financial repression and macroeconomic policy in India since 
reforms, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 23(2), 292-310. doi. 10.1093/oxrep/grm010  
Siddiqui, K. (2016a). A study of Singapore as a developmental state, in Y.-C. Kim (Ed.), Chinese 
Global Production Networks in ASEAN, (pp.157-188), London: Springer. 
Siddiqui, K. (2016b). Experiences of developmental state in India and Taiwan, in D.P. Tripathi & 
B.R. Deepak (Eds), India and Taiwan: From Benign Neglect to Pragmatism, (pp.155-182), New 
Delhi: Vij Books India Pvt Ltd.  
Siddiqui, K. (2015a). Trade liberalisation and economic development: A critical review, International 
Journal of Political Economy, 44(3), 228-247. doi. 10.1080/08911916.2015.1095050 
Siddiqui, K. (2015b). Foreign capital investment into developing countries: Some economic policy 
issues, Research in World Economy, 6(2), 14-29.  doi. 10.5430/rwe.v6n2p14 
Siddiqui, K. (2015c). Economic policy issues, Equilibrium Quarterly Journal of Economics and 
Economic Policy, 10(1), 9-32. doi. 10.12775/EQUIL.2015.001 
Siddiqui, K. (2014a). Contradictions in development: Growth and crisis in Indian economy, 
Economic and Regional Studies, 7(3), 82-98. 
Siddiqui, K. (2014b). Flows of foreign capital into developing countries: A critical review, Journal of 
International Business and Economics, 2(1), 29-46. 
Siddiqui, K. (2014c). Modernisation and displacement of rural communities in India, Journal of 
Social Business, 4(2-3), 3-27.  
Siddiqui, K. (2012). Malaysia’s socio-economic transformation in historical perspective, International 
Journal of Business and General Management, 1(2), 21-50. 
Siddiqui, K. (2010). Globalisation and neo-liberal economic reforms in India: A critical review, in 
(Eds.) S.K. Pramanick & R. Ganguly. Globalization in India: New Frontiers and Emerging 
Challenges, (pp.219-243), New Delhi: Prentice Hall. 
Siddiqui, K. (2009a). The current financial crisis and its impact on the emerging economies - China 
and India, Research in Applied Economics, 1(2), 1-28, doi. 10.5296/rae.v1i1.183    
Siddiqui, K. (2009b). The political economy of growth in China and India, Journal of Asian Public 
Policy, 1(2), 17-35. doi. 10.1080/17516230902734528 
Siddiqui, K. (1998). The export of agricultural commodities, poverty and ecological crisis: A case 
study of Central American Countries, Economic and Political Weekly, 26th September, 33(39),  
A128-A137.  
Siddiqui, K. (1989). Colonialism, hunger and backwardness in the developing countries, 
Materialisten, (in Norwegian) 3(4), 111-135. 
Stiglitz, J.E. (2004). Capital-market liberalization, globalization, and the IMF, Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy, 20(1), 57-71. doi. 10.1093/oxrep/grh004 
Stockhammer, E. (2015). Rising inequality as a cause of the present crisis, Cambridge Journal of 
Economics, 39, 935-958. doi. 10.1093/cje/bet052 
Soederberg, S. (2015). The BRICS’ dangerous endorsement of financial inclusion‛, in P. Bond, & A. 
Garcia, (Eds.), 2015. BRICS: An anti-capitalist critique, (pp. 251-253), London, Pluto Press. 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), (2013). The Rise of the South: Human Progress in 
a Diverse World, New York: UNDP. 
Wade, R. (1990). Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in the East 
Asian Industrialisation, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
Williamson, J.G. (2007). Global capital markets in the long run: A review of Maurice Obstfeld and 
Alan Taylor’s global capital markets, Journal of Economic Literature, 42(2), pp.400-409. doi. 
10.1257/jel.45.2.400 
Zhang, X. (2009). From banks to markets: Malaysian and Taiwanese finances and transition, Review 
of International Political Economy, 16(3), 382-408. doi. 10.1080/09692290802409210 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyrights 
Copyright for this article is retained by the author(s), with first publication rights granted to 
the journal. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the 
Creative Commons Attribution license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0). 
 
